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WORLD-POLITICS.

LONDON : ST. PETERSBURG : PARIS : WASHINGTON.

LONDON, *June, 1905.*

THE arrival of a new American Ambassador always, for England, takes on something of the nature of a national event. You will have already read how the steamer which brought Mr. White-law Reid to Plymouth was boarded out in the bay by the mayor of that famous port, by the President of the Southampton Chamber of Commerce, and by deputations from various commercial and mercantile associations of the locality. You will also have read the address of welcome presented to the new Ambassador and his reply thereto. But the real significance of the ceremony may for all that have escaped you. It is not to be found by studying the mere greetings interchanged nor even by weighing the cordiality of the sentiments expressed. Granting the occasion, its "note" could only be that of friendliness. The real and international significance of the ceremony lies in the fact that it should take place at all. The political ties that unite Great Britain and France are at this moment, and for many years are likely to be, closer than the political ties that unite Great Britain and America. The political ties that unite England and Japan are closer still. Yet neither the French nor the Japanese Ambassador is welcomed on his arrival with those complimentary attentions that always and almost as a matter of course mark the advent of the American Ambassador. It is nothing out of the way for the representative of a foreign Power, on his recall, to be publicly fêted in the capital of the State to which he is accredited. But for him to be greeted by officialdom and the people, on his arrival, before he has presented his credentials, before he has given any token either of his personality or of his policy—that is something unique. It is unique not only so far as England is con-

cerned, but so far as the entire world of diplomacy is concerned. The firmest Continental allies do not so honor their respective Ambassadors. The distinction, in short, is one bestowed by Great Britain alone and bestowed by her only on the representative of the United States. Need I add that its bestowal is absolutely spontaneous and unprompted. Whatever is done is the outcome of instincts and feelings that owe nothing whatever to official inspiration. All this, as it seems to me, makes a pleasant custom not only pleasanter still, but more significant. There can, indeed, be no mistaking its meaning. It is a token that the British people regard America as they regard no other country on earth; that they recognize the existence, between England and the United States, of a special relationship that does not depend for its well-being or its efficacy upon political arrangements; and that nothing appeals to them so surely as an opportunity for acknowledging this relationship, perpetuating it and perhaps expanding it. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that in the greetings, so simple yet so unparalleled, extended to Mr. Whitelaw Reid, there was concealed a profound international fact.

As to Mr. Reid himself, London assumes that he will not fall one inch below the almost abnormally high standard of social aptitude, of eloquence, of versatility and address that all England associates with the American Embassy. The only difficulty ahead of him, as one of the great London journals has pointed out, is that he has to succeed Mr. Choate, "whose six years' Ambassadorship," says this same organ, "will always rank as one of the most brilliant and inspiring episodes in Anglo-American relations." In one sense it is impossible to succeed Mr. Choate; his "touch" was peculiar and personal to himself; and the special characteristics which he stamped upon his term of service will probably never again be reproduced. Personality counts for so much,—counts, indeed, almost for everything,—in the position of an American Ambassador at the Court of St. James's, that two strong and able men, temperamentally dissimilar, cannot possibly win the same kind of success. Each can succeed, but the degree and quality of the triumph, as well as the methods by which it is obtained, must vary with the nature and the capacity of the individual. There is, therefore, no question of "succeeding" Mr. Choate. The only question is whether Mr. Whitelaw Reid, in his own way, will be able to make an

impression which, though different, will be relatively as great as Mr. Choate made. We in England are confident that he will. We are confident because, after declaring for fifty years that no one could take the place of the Ambassador who had just left us, we have always found that his successor could and did. We are also confident because we already know Mr. Reid. As the Envoy Extraordinary from the United States at the time of Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee and again at King Edward's Coronation, his flexibility and social tact made everywhere a most favorable impression. We know that the cause of Anglo-American amity has always found in Mr. Reid an advocate of conviction, experience and far-reaching effectiveness. We also know that, at the critical moment of the negotiations with Spain, Mr. Reid did perhaps more than any other American to launch his country on that career of Imperialism which has the unqualified sympathy of the British people. We are, therefore, inclined to welcome him with the utmost cordiality and to expect him, if not to fill Mr. Choate's place, at any rate to make a place of his own not less resplendent.

In a recent letter to this department of the *NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW* I mentioned the growing interest that Englishmen were taking in the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement; and I tried to make it clear that, while public opinion had come to no definite conclusion, the drift of national sentiment was towards not merely a renewal of the Agreement, but towards its expansion —its development, in fact, into a hard and fast alliance that would guarantee, by the whole force of both Powers, the Asiatic possessions of each. This drift, since I wrote, has been greatly quickened by a speech of Lord Lansdowne's. Addressing, on June 1st, a large party gathering, the Foreign Secretary used these momentous words:

"I think I may say that at no time has there, either on the side of the Japanese Government or upon that of His Majesty's, been any question whatever of a withdrawal from that Alliance. I might venture to go a little further and to say that, in our opinion, when the time comes, as it soon must, to consider what should be done with regard to the renewal of that Agreement, the only practical question will be whether it shall be renewed in its present form, or whether we should not seek for some means of strengthening and consolidating it. That Alliance has been a potent influence for peace; and if it should prove to be possible so to modify it that it would not only prevent the spread of the con-

flagration, when the conflagration had begun, but prevent a conflagration from taking place at all, I believe that all true lovers of peace—and we are all lovers of peace in this country—would rejoice at such a consummation."

Such a declaration from such a man can only mean that British diplomacy is prepared to substitute for the present compact a more stringent Agreement—one, presumably, that would bind Great Britain and Japan to go to each other's assistance were either to be attacked, not as now by two Powers, but by one. Into the vast questions raised by such possibilities—questions that have, of course, their European as well as their Asiatic aspects—I do not now propose to enter; but I may perhaps be allowed to reproduce the well-weighed sentences in which, after a day or two's reflection, "The Times" referred to the subject:

"It is not, however, necessarily to the two contracting Powers alone that the Alliance would afford an invaluable guarantee for the preservation of their possessions and the protection of their interests in Asia. Inasmuch as it would be directed solely against any further attempts to disturb the *status quo* or to undermine the freedom of commercial intercourse in which all nations claim to be interested, we see no reason why it should provoke the antagonism or suspicions of other Powers. To the Chinese Empire it would give security against encroachment from without, and afford breathing-time for the work of internal reformation of which the Chinese themselves must sooner or later recognize the need. It would preserve the 'open door' which the United States have proclaimed to be a vital American interest. It would, in fact, be essentially a defensive pact to which all other Powers actuated by similar purposes could adhere, and it might thus become the nucleus of a pacific league which would arrest the dangerous development of international rivalries in Asia and ultimately stay the growth of the heavy burden of armaments which such rivalries inevitably bring in their train."

Nor was Lord Lansdowne less precise in his references to the Anglo-French *entente*. He declared that it had been of priceless value in "mitigating the friction and the trouble which are inevitable when a great war is in progress," and that there never was a moment when the good relations between the two countries were more firmly based than at present. In that opinion the whole of England readily and thankfully concurs. Anglo-French relations are in no sense a party question. Up to a certain point as much may, no doubt, be said for Anglo-Japanese relations. Were the Liberals, that is, to come into power to-morrow, the renewal of the Agreement of 1902 would be as assured

in their hands as in the hands of the present Government. But I question whether the Liberals would be prepared to go beyond continuing the compact on its present terms. I do not think, so far as I can judge from the tentative utterances of their leaders, that they would consider it good policy to extend its scope. They have not, at any rate, seconded the suggestion; some of their journals have even protested against it; and though possibly they would not oppose it were it to be proposed by the Conservative Government—great issues of foreign politics in this country being rarely brought to a House of Commons vote—I am under the impression they would hesitate long before proposing it themselves. But as regards France the Liberals are not one whit behind Lord Lansdowne and his colleagues. They share to the full, they may in the near future be even expected to lead, the national enthusiasm for the *entente cordiale* and for its development into a yet more intimate compact. That is a fact to which recent and future events in Morocco are bound to lend more than a little importance. The rejection of the French proposals for the reorganization of Morocco, and the Sultan's counter-proposal for an international conference on the whole Moorish question, followed by M. Delcassé's resignation, raise what is likely to prove a tense and prolonged crisis. These facts, at any rate, bring the Anglo-French Agreement to a decisive test, for I need scarcely say that the value of that Agreement will be appraised by the popular opinion of France precisely in the degree that it succeeds or fails in realizing French aims in Morocco. England is beginning to understand that and to accept its consequences. If I rightly estimate her present temper she is resolved to support France in Morocco as unreservedly as she is supporting Japan in the Far East. That implies, of course, in this Moorish entanglement, a willingness to follow France's lead and to take the cue from her. As a consequence of this copartnership both in aim and method it is extremely probable that the Sultan's proposal for an international conference will be rejected not only by France, Great Britain and Spain, but by every European Power to whom it is submitted, with the exception of Germany. The first point in the game has been scored indisputably by the Wilhelmstrasse; but with patience, with adroitness, and above all, with loyal co-operation between the Quai d'Orsay and Downing Street, the final victory ought to rest with France.

Domestic politics during the past month have continued to revolve round the Fiscal Question—not so much around its merits as a policy, as around its relation to Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Balfour, Mr. Balfour's relation to Mr. Chamberlain, and the relation of every one and everything to the Colonial Conference which is due to meet, but probably will not be summoned, in 1906. It is useless to expect Americans to be interested in the thousand and one involved and mystifying points that are raised, debated, but somehow never answered, in the discussion of these various complexities. It is useless because even Englishmen are wearying of them and no longer pretend to fathom the connection which each may be supposed to have with the other. The whole agitation has degenerated into such a chaos of evasions, half-lights, equivocations and uncertainties that the plain British voter is frankly unable to see a yard ahead of him. He knows, indeed, what Mr. Chamberlain wants and what he advocates, for Mr. Chamberlain is always plain-spoken. Nor has he any doubt of where the Liberals stand. At times, too, he has a glimmering of Mr. Balfour's policy, but how far it is a policy complete in itself, precisely where it differs from the Chamberlain programme, precisely where it is identical with it, and whether Mr. Balfour or Mr. Chamberlain is the real leader of the Unionist party, he simply does not know. Every speech that is forthcoming from a member of the Cabinet adds something to the bewilderment, and something, too, to the universal exasperation. On May 22nd in the House of Commons that exasperation culminated in a scene that for a whole hour placed the British Parliament and the Austrian Reichsrath on the same level. In the country it finds its expression at the polls. In the first week of June two by-elections were held, one at Whitby, the other at Chichester. At Whitby a Conservative majority of 1,083 was turned into a Liberal majority of 445, and at Chichester a Conservative majority of 1,875 was reduced to 412. Altogether since the present Government came into office in 1900 there have been, in England, Scotland and Wales, 59 contested by-elections. Five years ago these 59 seats were held by 43 Conservatives and 16 Liberals; they are now held by 25 Conservatives and 34 Liberals. Since the last General Election the Liberal vote has increased 37 per cent. and the Conservative vote has decreased 2 per cent. That is the answer of the country to Ministerial "tactics."

ST. PETERSBURG, June, 1905.

A NEW era in international politics, and it may be in civilization, has been inaugurated by the Battle of the Sea of Japan. On few naval or land engagements of modern or ancient times have so many or such far-reaching issues hung: they included the upshot of a campaign, the fate of an Empire and the destinies of a race. For Russia the destruction of her fleet means the close of the autocratic epoch and the beginning of a reign of democracy. One-man rule is now virtually dead, while the masses are quickly awakening to a sense of their rights and duties. And the new conditions of national life are become evident to almost all: ministers, journalists, professors, merchants discern them clearly; the masses apprehend them dimly, while the few who are still blind to them are the people who will not see. And chief among these are the Tsar himself and a small band of interested and disinterested adherents.

The Autocrat, upon whose mind apparently no deep or lasting impression can be made by men or events, was hopeful and buoyant down to the very day of the naval disaster. And even now he looks with serenity upon the future of his Empire and the prospects of his house. As peace and war still depend upon his will, one cannot gauge the situation without reckoning with its manifestations. Up to the 27th of May the Tsar had put his trust in Rosjestvensky. And during the ten or fourteen days that preceded the historic encounter of the squadrons, the Autocrat spoke often and confidently of Rosjestvensky's impending victory, his only fear being lest the enemy should shrink from an encounter and hide. And in his home policy the Tsar discounted the looked-for triumph. Thus he allowed his promises to his people to be interpreted in the light of it and all the concessions he had bestowed in ukases and rescripts to be greatly restricted or wholly repealed by Government *communiqués*, ministerial circulars and other kindred documents.

One of the most significant of these promises dealt with the convocation of a representative assembly. M. de Witte had frankly said that that innovation was necessary to the dynasty and would be ruinous to the Autocracy. And Nicholas II repented of having signed the rescript almost before the ink with which he had written his name was dry. Still as the Tsar's word—like the laws of the Medes and Persians—altereth not, the letter of

the promise will be observed. But only the letter. The Emperor's heart is not in it. He knows what is good for his 140 million subjects better than they can be aware of it themselves. Three weeks ago the then Minister of the Interior, who was charged with transforming the Imperial concession into a working institution, reported progress to his Imperial master. His Majesty listened, frowned and then said: "Yes; I see you have not been idle; but you cannot expect me to praise the work. I am not in sympathy with it." M. Bulyghin bowed respectfully and added that he did not like it himself. Shortly afterwards the same Minister in conversation with a friend remarked: "I am powerless to do anything good or bad until Rosjestvensky has put force into my arm. When he has thrashed the Japs, I may act vigorously, but until then I am palsied."

A further illustration of the Tsar's pathetic hopefulness was given by the Marine Minister, Admiral Avellan. Two days before the fateful battle that official, from whom Nicholas II received daily food for hopes, allowed himself to be interviewed by a Russian journalist for the edification of the whole Russian people. He said that the one thing which people feared was that the Japanese might perhaps let the Russian fleet enter Vladivostok, might attack them with torpedo-boats and finally shut them up in the port. "But there is no likelihood of that," he added. "The epic of Port Arthur will not be repeated. Rosjestvensky is not the man to allow himself to be bottled up in a harbor. Neither shall the Japs pounce upon him unawares. He will himself, we may be sure, seek for an encounter with the foe and will endeavor after a hard-fought battle to wrest the command of the sea from them. . . . They shall be compelled to meet him whether they will or no. He has many ways of compelling them to accept battle. For example, Rosjestvensky has only to bombard a Japanese port and Togo's squadron will have no choice but to sally forth and defend it." In a word, the Minister took it for granted that the enemy would sedulously avoid Rosjestvensky, who hungered and thirsted for battle. And that was precisely the view adopted by Nicholas II and his secret advisers.

And all the Tsar's domestic policy was shaped by the belief that the Baltic Squadron would retrieve the losses sustained by Makaroff, Ukhtomsky, Kuropatkin and Rennenkampf, and that the academic concessions to liberalism wrested from the Autoc-

racy after those reverses, but not yet carried out, might then be informally revoked or at any rate disregarded. And it was only a matter of weeks or days. For the Tsar moves and has his being in the present, which he looks upon as lasting. He resembles a man on a thawing ice-floe which is fast drifting towards a warmer climate: while the ice melts and breaks around him, he is absorbed in architectural plans for building a spacious edifice on the island which he deems fixed and solid. So little does the recent past, the past of military defeats, naval disasters and moral bankruptcy, influence his modes of thought that he imperially ignores it in his schemes for the future. The extent to which Nicholas II thus disbelieves in solid fact and builds on airy fancy may be gathered from his attitude towards the district of Port Arthur and the Province of Manchuria, which he still treats as integral parts of Russia. Indeed, his paternal solicitude for those two regions is more tender now than ever before. Admiral Alexeieff' is still his Viceroy, trusted and well paid, although he no longer resides at Port Arthur or Harbin, but in the Hôtel d'Europe in St. Petersburg.

During the past six months whole chancelleries have been kept busy working for the welfare of the provinces of Port Arthur and Manchuria as though there had been no battles lost on land and sea. Truly a pathetic spectacle! His Majesty first summoned General Ignatieff to advise him respecting the better government of the two provinces, and having received the reply that it might perhaps be better to wait until they were reconquered, rejoined: "Oh, that's a foregone conclusion—the question of a few months. What is important is that we be ready with a plan of reorganization. Help me to frame it." And the work which thereupon began has since been moving apace. Alexeieff's powers have been graciously extended by the Emperor, who now allows him to have four departments, one of them a diplomatic chancellery—and his Majesty is actually abolishing a Governorship in order to add to the jurisdiction of his lucky favorite. The educational system of Port Arthur is also undergoing a sweeping change, and in particular the charter, programme and staff of the school of forestry are being considerably modified. Again, two or three judges were nominated last March and two others have recently been asked for by the Minister of Justice, the request being preferred on the eve of the Battle of the Sea of Japan. And all for the weal of

the province of Port Arthur! That makes four or five judges more than were needed eighteen months ago when the Liaotung Province still belonged to Russia. The phenomenon is psychologically interesting. There is a certain analogy between it and the case of mutilated men who continue to feel pain in the limbs already amputated. But the likeness is imperfect. For probably no one has ever yet heard that such persons order boots and stockings, or baths and bandages, for the feet or arms which have been cut off and buried.

If the Tsar really meant either to grant political reform or to convoke a legislative assembly he would charge the latter body with the work of setting forth the nation's needs and making proposals to satisfy them. But in lieu of this he has let loose a plague of commissions on the land.

At the close of Plehve's régime there were four great committees: one to deal with agricultural industry, another to settle the peasants' question, a third for the reform of provincial institutions and a fourth for the affairs of the Far East. It was admitted soon after Plehve's death that these commissions were merely squandering time and money and that no public good would result from their deliberations. The needs of the country must, it was urged, be studied and satisfied by representatives of the people. But the Tsar created a vast number of commissions, among which the following have attained a certain degree of notoriety: (1) Count A. P. Ignatieff's commission to ascertain how far it would be safe to give up the system of governing Russia by martial law tempered or aggravated by administrative discretion; (2) Bulyghin's commission to prepare the ways and means for such a body of national representatives as will leave Autocracy absolutely intact; (3) Goremykin's commission on the condition of the peasantry which has succeeded that of Witte, which followed that of Plehve—all of which were abolished before they had made any changes; (4) Kobeko's commission on the needs of the press, of which the ostensible object is to make the press as free as is compatible with Autocracy, and the method is to employ commissioners of whom the majority are warm friends of repression—while these special pleaders were discussing theories, practical measures were passed against the press more stringent than ever had been adopted before; (5) Kokofftseff's commission on the Labor Question; (6) Saburoff's commission on the transforma-

tion of the Senate; (7) Timofeyeff's commission on State insurance; (8) Kutler's commission on the Income Tax; (9) Izvolsky's commission on schools; (10) Yermoloff's commission to find means for rendering the working of the educational institutions normal; (11) Roop's commission to inquire into the surrender of Port Arthur. Over and above these commissions is the Committee of Ministers whose functions are identical with those of the Ministerial Council. And last of all comes the most recent of all commissions, which Nicholas II composed of five Ministers and one Director, for the purpose of settling the land question without disturbing anybody or changing anything: the making of omelettes without the breaking of eggs.

And those are only some of the extraordinary bodies now sitting. They have on the one hand usurped the functions usually discharged by the permanent administration, and on the other they are forestalling the work of the representative chamber. And it should be borne in mind that there are many more commissions which overlap, so that no one can say where the functions of this one end and those of the other begin. Thus there are a committee for the affairs of Finland under the chairmanship of Senator Tagantseff, a commission for the settlement of the question of religious toleration and a committee for the reform of local self-government which exists but has not done anything—and very many more. Nobody for a moment believes that these commissions will elaborate any system of reform. For there is no unity of plan among them, no co-operation, nay in some cases no desire to do anything but gain time by throwing dust in the eyes of the people. If chaos prevailed under Plehve, it was worse confounded under Bulygin, nor will order be evolved before a new spirit has moved over the face of things. And many fear lest it be a spirit of internecine strife.

Now of all those commissions the only one which has done good work is that over which M. Witte presided. It was he who framed and passed the Religious Toleration Bill, and he was on the point of getting a "peasant reform scheme" carried by his commission when it was dissolved by the Tsar at Pobiedonostseff's instigation. As soon as Witte's religious toleration act was signed by Nicholas II, 600 Uniats theretofore kept by force in the Orthodox fold hastened to re-enter the Catholic Church in the parish of Kusleff in Sedletz. Altogether in that province and the neigh-

boring one of Lublin about 26,000 persons abandoned the Orthodox Church for the Roman Communion during the past three or four weeks. But now illegal hindrances are being thrown in the way of such changes. The Catholic and Protestant clergy have been ordered to receive no more converts into their respective communities without instructions from the Government. And these are not forthcoming. In like manner a few weeks ago the Emperor published a ukase allowing the Poles to send telegrams in their own tongue. Delighted, they rushed to the offices to avail themselves of the coveted privilege—but their messages were refused. Then they complained to the authorities of St. Petersburg, who told them that Polish telegrams could be accepted only at offices where there were officials versed in that tongue, and that in most villages, towns and cities there were none. In just the same way on August 24th last year the Tsar solemnly abolished flogging, and later on publicly condemned the illegal methods of his administration and announced his determination to establish the reign of law instead. But since then the administrators have received from the Tsar himself permission still further to extend their discretionary power and suspend the operation of the laws; the police have been allowed a degree of license greater than that which they possessed under Plehve, and as for flogging, it is still systematically resorted to not only as a punishment, but also as a means of torture, to compel confessions and revelations.

And the bureaucracy cares as little for the interests of the nation as for the feelings or the dignity of individuals, or the sanctity of law. Urgent orders for the victualling of the troops are set on one side while officials smoke their cigarettes and chat with friends. About a month ago a friend of mine went to a ministry to see one of the Directors. The moment he entered the department he heard a group of officials quarrelling about an order which had arrived seventeen days previously: an order to forward at once certain supplies for the Baltic Squadron. The responsible official denied that it was on his table, affirmed that he had never received it, while another asseverated that he had duly delivered it. The written order was finally found on the responsible official's table buried under a heap of other papers. Of course the demands had not been complied with and when the act of negligence was discovered it was too late to repair it.

But now the bureaucracy with its tangle of commissions is seemingly at the end of its tether. For it has of necessity left untouched two all-important questions which are bound to solve themselves at its cost, nay at all costs; one is the status of the Jews, who alone of all religions and races have not profited by any of the various measures of relief introduced since Plehve's death, and the other is the condition of the peasantry. The Jews, indeed, have not only had no surcease of sorrow and persecution, but they have been subjected to a series of ruinous attacks and sanguinary massacres deliberately prearranged by the agents of the Government, which afterwards calumniated them and endeavored to make it appear that they were the aggressors. Even a moderate Anti-Semite would be horrified by the sickening details of the clubbing and hacking to death of people who wanted only to live and let live. M. Witte was anxious to solve once for all the problem of the Russian Jews, beset though it be with difficulties. And he would have settled it as it is settled in the United States, on the basis of equal rights to all. But none of his colleagues had the courage to face the task and they all knew that the Government would veto every reasonable proposal they might make. And so the Jews were left unemancipated, while Calmucks, Kirghizes, Chuvashes and all the other wild and uncivilized tribes in the Empire received the same rights as Russians possessed. And the Jews must be angels or brutes to remain inactive while a weak and tottering government desires that they shall continue to subsist as helots.

The other section of the population whose attitude may prove decisive is the peasantry. The Russian mujiks are treated regularly as tax-paying machines and exceptionally as human beings. They have no rights, and whenever the Tsar bestows upon them any privilege it is forthwith taken away by the official known as "land chief," who stands toward the peasant *in loco parentis*, for the Russian mujik is always an infant in the eyes of the State. Now the tillers of the soil in the Tsardom are generally ignorant and superstitious. They cannot, therefore, be expected to know the *pros* and *cons* of political questions. They have far too little land to pay the heavy taxes and support themselves. Therefore an addition to the size of their farms is the one thing necessary and that is possible only if the crown and the imperial lands and even a portion of private landed property be sold to the

peasants at moderate rates and with the assistance of banks which are not bent on earning money. And this the whole reform party is pledged to grant, whereas the Tsar in one of his latest ukases expressly refused to encourage hopes of any such relief. For that reason, if for no other, it is likely that the bulk of the peasantry, if they can be got to understand the issues and to believe the assurances of the Liberals, will make common cause with the reform party to obtain their ends. But it is perhaps still more probable that they will simply seize on private property without joining either side.

PARIS, June, 1905.

THE French have had some reason lately for being roused from their usual apathy with respect to foreign politics. At no period since the critical early years of the Republic has the press been compelled to turn so anxious an ear to rumors from the outside, and at the same time has been so unanimous in laughing all probabilities of war to scorn, a sure sign of uneasiness of mind.

The fluctuations were of startling suddenness. Until late in March a universal calm seemed to prevail in Europe, and, even in the Far East, there was good hope of some agreement being come to by the belligerents. The *entente cordiale* between England and France had just removed all likelihood of friction in Morocco and Egypt; the shocking state of affairs in Russia had cooled even the hottest champions of an exclusive alliance with the Tsar; General Porter was bringing to an end a most successful embassy and preparing the expressions of good feeling we heard last month from himself and from MM. Rouvier and Delcassé, which were so natural that no trace of the diplomatic accent could be detected in them; Spain had adhered to the Moroccan agreement, and Italy still under the favorable impression left by M. Loubet's visit to Rome was pursuing with perfect good-will peaceful negotiations in Abyssinia.

Germany herself had never been so friendly. She unhesitatingly offered to substitute her financiers for ours when the sixth Russian loan was meeting with nothing but distrust in Paris. She gave, through the Emperor himself, the most solemn assertion of her peaceful dispositions. While the seven years' policy of M. Delcassé had ignored her in the series of international conventions

concluded by France, she only seemed willing to enter into what eventually might become an alliance.

Who will account for the unexpected change that took place in the Emperor's attitude? It is well known that there exists in Germany a strong party the ruling idea of which is that their country thrives by war and can only remain prosperous by war. On the other hand the Emperor is described as mobile and easily swayed. But the reasons of his change, while political circumstances remained exactly the same, must be forever mysterious. The difficulties of French action in Morocco were only growing more visible, in spite of the good-will of England and Spain, when the Emperor substituted threatening language for his calm utterances of the month before—choosing, too, for the delivery of his new feelings a place close to our frontier—and betook himself to Tangier with a deliberation that would have left no room for doubt, even if his speech had not been more to the point than the addresses of monarchs usually are. On his return there ensued, between the French and German papers, one of those brisk conversations which are a form—safe enough in some respects—of modern diplomatic intercourse, the German press complaining in sour language that the Wilhelmstrasse had been left out of the Morocco arrangement, the "*Matin*" replying that there was a French ambassador in Berlin who was ready with the necessary explanations. In the mean time actual preparations for war were being made on both sides of the frontier, and are still carried on at the present moment, though the French and German ambassadors at Fez are apparently on the best of terms, and the visit of the King of Spain to Paris has afforded a powerful diversion.

It is needless to try and describe the feelings of what one is wont to call "the country" at the possibility of a war with Germany. One of the chief causes of the popularity of the Republican Government has been its aversion to war, its calmness at critical junctures when the pride of a monarch would have been likely to bring about a conflagration. The recollections of 1870 are still too fresh to render a war popular unless the national dignity were evidently disregarded. In Parliament, in the press and in political circles the case may be somewhat different. English and French interests being at the present moment on the same side, and Germany in the way of both nations, it cannot be doubted that the advisability of accepting the contest was seriously considered

in the upper circles of French opinion. An ex-minister, M. Boucher, expressed his belief that war was inevitable. A similar speech was circulated as coming from no less a person than General Brugère, the commander-in-chief of all the French troops. One evening of the second week of May the editor of an old and powerful paper, whose opinion carries great weight, counted as many as seven members of the Cabinet who, he knew for certain, were inclined towards a declaration of war.

But all this lies more or less in the region of conjecture. One fact stands out clearly, viz., the view taken by the Chamber of the Tangier incident; and to the currents of opinion visible in Parliament on that occasion we ought to give serious attention.

M. Delcassé's opponents were of two different classes, and belonged to two different parties: on the one side the Nationalists, on the other the Socialists. The former attacked the Foreign Minister through narrow-mindedness, through an excess of diffidence, above all through the instinct infallibly impelling them to attack and snap at random. The former sided against him under a misconceived idea of broad-mindedness which, beyond certain limits, is not easily distinguished from a mild form of lunacy. The Nationalist sticks above all to the national prejudices which he mistakes for national glory. He is a born enemy of England, has not forgotten one detail of the Hundred Years' War, and scents a snare wherever he sees Albion's hand. One of his sorest grievances is the memory of the expedition to Egypt, and he seldom fails to hint that M. de Freycinet had been sold to England. Fashoda is another tender point which he can no more suffer to hear mentioned than to see forgotten. In such a mental disposition the final cession of Egypt by the recent Anglo-French agreement must have appeared an act of treason, and the English countenance of our action in Morocco was sure to be construed as a stratagem to get France into a scrape. The Nationalists in their press and in the Chamber always describe Morocco as a nest of hidden difficulties with nothing to repay the trouble of meeting them. They do not notice that the language they use with regard to the advisability of occupying Morocco is exactly the same that induced M. de Freycinet to recall our men-of-war from Alexandria, and the Nationalists of to-morrow would certainly abuse M. Delcassé if he listened to the Nationalists of to-day. In the mean time the expectant attitude of the Moorish

Government between M. von Tattenbach and M. Saint-René-Talandier confirmed them in the conviction that we have given up the real thing for the shadow.

The Socialists take quite a different view of the matter. Before stating it I would point out an important particular. For six years the Socialist party was part of the Bloc, that is to say of the majority, and carefully forbore from opposing either M. Waldeck-Rousseau or M. Combes because the two Premiers were carrying out an anticlerical policy which was nearer to their hearts than anything else. In those days I saw many an intelligent foreigner mistake their attitude for real wisdom and judge them by a man of the stamp, for instance, of Mr. John Burns. The event alone proves that their nature was still the same, and that they had never ceased, while making use of the *bourgeois*, to hate and despise them. The moment M. Rouvier took office they were once more threatening and sneering on their benches.

Of all the members of the new Cabinet, M. Delcassé is the most objectionable in their eyes. The reasons of their dislike to him are manifold. In the first place they think him too personal for a democratic functionary. M. Delcassé has now been more than seven years in office. Apart from the first days of his Ministry when he had to arrange the Fashoda incident he managed to work at the same time so quietly and successfully that nobody had occasion to object to anything he was doing. So he was, for seven years, practically left to himself. The country had no reason to regret it, but the Socialists do not act upon the same principles as the country, and they object to anybody doing anything by himself. They want the servants of democracy to give a full account of themselves to democracy, and that is exactly what a Foreign Minister cannot and must not do. M. Delcassé, who is a Southerner by birth and, in private life, a man of quick spirit and lively speech, is in Parliament the most guarded of orators. He has succeeded many a time in putting off dangerous questions by summoning the discontented deputy and giving him private explanations. When he has to address the Chamber he writes what he wishes to say to the last word, and is seldom induced to add one syllable that had not been carefully weighed beforehand.

Besides this more general grievance they have another more definite. The Socialists are a great deal more touchy when Ger-

many is in question than when it is their own country, or, as one of them put it quite recently, when the tyrant called fatherland is at issue.

Germany is dear to the Socialists for two reasons. They look upon the country of Marx and Bebel as the land of election of their theories, the one in which the coalition of the brain and the hand, of the Marburg thinker and the Gladbach laborer, is most likely to bring about the subversion of the old order of things and the establishment of the new. In the second place, they know that whenever hostility against Germany reappears it takes the shape of the Alsatian claims, and these claims are, in their theories, the very embodiment of barbarism. In this connection, M. Delcassé is their *bête noire*. In 1870, a very poor usher in a provincial school, he came to Paris and became a journalist under the pressure of the Franco-German war. A writer in Gambetta's paper, the "*République Française*," and to this day a devout admirer of the Tribune, he is one of those for whom the question of Alsace-Lorraine must ever be open. But, conformably with his master's speech "always think, never speak of it," he never mentions either the lost provinces or their conqueror. It is wonderful that he should have managed during his seven years' office never once to name Germany in the Chamber. It was this very circumstance that the Socialists, through M. de Pressensé, turned against him with a violence by which he seems to have been staggered. Strangely enough this self-possessed man was discomposed by the very clamors he ought to have expected the most, offered his resignation, and let the Premier repeatedly address the Chamber in his place.

Is there some secret reason for a despondency which lasted some time, and ought we to believe that M. Rouvier hurt his colleague's feelings by insisting on too minute an account of the Moroccan transactions? One feels almost inclined to believe it. Under the two last Cabinets the Socialist vote decided the fate of the Government. The new majority having annexed moderate elements, the Socialists are only an obstreperous set, and their opposition can hardly account for the evident discontent of a man who had never been known to lose either his head or his temper.

But it is useless to speculate on the unknown causes of doubtful effects. Suffice it to say that M. Delcassé was backed by

a very large majority when the support thus given him meant much more than a mere platonic demonstration.

M. Delcassé was hardly freed from his anxieties on our Eastern frontier, and King Edward's visit had only just proved that the uncle's views were widely different from those of the nephew, when the question of international neutrality threatened to come most unfortunately between England and France. This difficulty following immediately on the King's visit, when the Parisians had felt once more that no monarch is as much at home over here as Edward VII, was seen on both sides with a displeasure which boded its speedy settlement. But here once more, while the Nationalists themselves supported M. Delcassé, our Socialists thought it advisable to make the Minister's position more uncomfortable than it already was. What had happened off the coasts of Madagascar and Indo-China has never been known for certain. The poor defence of the Russian squadrons at Tsushima and the Liancourt-Rocks would induce one to suppose that they could hardly have reached their far-off destination without some friendly assistance. How far could such assistance be thought permissible in view of the Franco-Russian alliance and of the French rules of neutrality will be stated by somebody more expert than the writer. Suffice it to say that Mr. Balfour and even M. Motono, the Japanese minister in Paris, were sooner satisfied with M. Delcassé's explanations than the Socialists, whose mouthpiece, M. de Pressensé, did his best to demonstrate that the French agents had been inexcusably in the wrong. The reason of this excessive nicety does not lie, of course, in any special sympathy for England, nor in a sympathy with Japan. It can be accounted for only by their dislike—natural enough—of Russia, and by their ill-will against M. Delcassé.

The Russian disaster at Tsushima has only made the situation of the Minister more difficult. The Nationalist press which had backed him while the danger was imminent, now lays at his door the responsibility of another danger in the near future. The "*Eclair*" and the papers of the same shade seem to be hypnotized by the unexpected rise of the Yellow Race, and inveigh against a policy which makes us subservient to their plans. Between their hatred of Germany—striving to thwart all our efforts in Morocco—and their dread of seeing a Japanese squadron threaten Indo-China, they forget one of the great dogmas of Nationalism

and advocate a reconciliation with the Kaiser. They insist that the naval forces of Germany are indispensable to us if we want to keep up our situation in the Far East, and speak with disgust of the *entente cordiale* as of a dupery. They are sure that within a few years England will be compelled to attempt the complete destruction of the German fleet and contend that we shall be losers by it, as the Japanese will have more elbow-room, and are in the mood for availing themselves of it. Consequently they advocate the continuation of the Russo-Japanese war by the method of "victorious retreat," and the endless putting off of the moment when Russia ought to pay the war indemnity without which Japan will find herself exhausted before long.

This seems a very short-sighted view. Why should France be a loser in a war which weakened Germany? Why should England go beyond the limits of her treaty with Japan, and increase a power which possible misunderstandings may turn against herself? And last and above all, why stick with unintelligent obstinacy to the crude idea that the Yellow Race ought to be altogether left out of the European concert because they are yellow? To go on treating the Japanese as barbarians is the acme of stupidity. And to imagine that their interest lies solely in an alliance with China is childish. That they have to think mostly of Asiatic Powers is evident—though the globe is much smaller than it used to be—but England is an Asiatic Power, and so is Russia, and who knows that in ten years Japan may not find herself nearer Russia than to any other Power? The Nationalists would be right if the European balance of power were the only thing to consider, but the gradual interference of Russia in European affairs, the increase of the military power of the United States and the wonderfully rapid civilizing of Japan, have substituted a world equilibrium instead. This primary political truth M. Delcassé had the misfortune of realizing too long before a large section of the press of this country. He may have to suffer for it, but then France will be a sufferer too.

There would be too much to say, if I wanted to give a fair account of our home politics in the last two months, especially if I endeavored fully to describe the slow progress of Disestablishment. Only six clauses of the Bill—which consists of over fifty—have been passed in a three months' debate, and it grows doubtful whether the Chamber will succeed in despatching the rest within

the few weeks of the summer session. The clauses discussed so far concerned the disposal of Church property. It would appear at first sight that this property should go entirely, after the separation of Church and State, to its present and—to all intents and purposes—legitimate owners. But, in this country where political hair-splitters are always talking about liberty, matters are never arranged so simply. Supposing schisms to make their appearance in the Roman Catholic Church—the Radical orators argue—why should the law provide that the schismatic bodies shall have no claim to part of the property? If it did, would not religious liberty be disregarded? This reasoning had appeared futile to all the Chamber before Easter, and even M. Jaurés and M. Briand had branded it as a hypocritical way of depriving the Church of what is her own. During the Easter holidays a long and interesting controversy between M. Jaurés and M. Clémenceau disengaged from the clouds which had so far obscured it the principle that Disestablishment was desirable, not to return to Church and State their freedom with regard to each other, but merely to dispense the State from parting any longer with the eight million dollars' indemnity it paid annually to the Church. Consequently, as money is another word for independence, the first step to take was to reduce Church property as much as possible. On this principle the majority—without any interference on the part of M. Rouvier, who tolerates the policy of separation but does not care for it—has acted since the Easter recess, but, sitting after sitting, the indefatigable orator, M. Ribot, compels them to own they are continually belying their dearest theories, and the difficulty they find in dividing quibbles greatly retards the progress of the Bill.

P. S.—The resignation of M. Delcassé, which had been spoken of for a few hours as a necessity, is now a fact. The Minister was compelled to take this step by M. Rouvier and all the members of the Cabinet.

The Socialist and Nationalist papers exult. One of the latter puts the matter in a nutshell in the following terms: "Breaking with England means peace, with Germany it means war." I need not add anything to this statement.

It is a melancholy truth that M. Delcassé has been sacrificed to Germany.

WASHINGTON, June, 1905.

OWING largely to the fact that Mr. Roosevelt's original intention to convoke the Fifty-ninth Congress in extra session is understood to have been abandoned definitely, public attention at the Federal capital has been diverted temporarily from internal affairs and concentrated on the President's foreign policy. Named in the order of their importance, the questions brought into the foreground of discussion since Mr. Roosevelt's return from his recreative tour and his resumption of the helm of administration, are the outcome of his well-conceived attempt to prevail upon the parties to the Far-Eastern War to enter into direct negotiations with a view to a speedy termination of the conflict; the decision at which the President may arrive with reference to the participation of the United States in the international conference proposed by the Sultan of Morocco; the response likely to be made to the petition of many Norwegian citizens of this republic that the independence of Norway may be officially recognized; and the course that may be taken to allay the resentment evinced in China at the offensively rigorous enforcement of the provisions of the Chinese Exclusion Act by American functionaries at ports of entry. There is, no doubt, a distinction to be drawn between what is technically known as a tender of good offices and the disinterested suggestion made by our Chief Magistrate, in the capacity of an impartial friend of both combatants, to the Foreign Offices of Tokio and St. Petersburg. During the war of the United States with Spain, it will be remembered that the French Republic proposed to employ its good offices for the arrangement of a peace, and that the proposal was accepted by the Madrid Government. In pursuance thereof, M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador at Washington, drew up, in conjunction with our Secretary of State, a protocol which formed the basis of the treaty subsequently concluded at Paris. Nothing of the kind was suggested in this instance by Mr. Roosevelt, and it is questionable whether, even if requested, he would have consented to assume the rôle of mediator, much less that of negotiator on behalf of one of the belligerents. All he did was to seize the opportunity, apparently afforded by the destruction of Rosjestvensky's fleet, to inform simultaneously and courteously both parties to the war that, in his judgment, it was for the interest of neutral Powers and of the civilized world that representatives of the belligerents

should meet in conference, for the purpose of learning whether a further waste of blood and treasure might not be averted. Only with reference to the purely preliminary business of designating the time and place at which the conference might be held did he signify a willingness to officiate as an intermediary. The impartial good-will of such a demonstration could scarcely fail to be recognized, and recognition was not stinted so far as the conventional tenor of the replies was concerned. Although Japan, as the Power which, during the pending contest, has never encountered a reverse, might properly enough have answered that she is now, and always has been, ready to entertain a direct application for peace on the part of her opponent, the Tokio Government expressed to Mr. Roosevelt a keen appreciation of the benevolence of his motives, and assured him of its readiness to depute agents to confer with representatives of the Tsar, whenever it should have reason to believe that the St. Petersburg Government was sincerely desirous of bringing the war to a close. The Mikado would consent, it was added, to appoint plenipotentiaries to that end. The Russian response, however, was less straightforward and unequivocal, if we may judge from the account of it officially published in St. Petersburg by Count Lamsdorff, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Russia's consent to negotiate was conditioned, it seems, on her being convinced that peace was wished for by Japan, and the description of the former Power's negotiators as "plenipotentiaries" was qualified by the statement that they would not be authorized in advance to accept any proposal, but would simply be empowered to transmit Japan's suggestions for the gracious approval of the Tsar. This assumption of a high and mighty attitude on the part of a Government which, far from having been victorious, had been uniformly beaten, must have savored strongly of the ridiculous at Tokio, and the notion that an armistice would be granted in consideration of such ambiguous and inconclusive assurances was, of course, dismissed as inadmissible. Once burnt, twice shy. Credulity would be stupidity, in view of the ample experience of the shifty, double-faced and perfidious character of Russian diplomacy, acquired, not only by Japan, but by the United States, during the disillusionizing months which preceded the outbreak of hostilities. Apparently, the Grand-Ducal coterie, which still dominates the weak and vacillating Tsar, will have to be pulled from its high

horse, and have the consciousness of its military impotence driven home to it before anything like an honest and adequate promise can be wrung from it.

Those observers, therefore, who are accustomed to forecast the future by the past, and who did not look for any speedy exhibition of common sense by the Russian reactionists, were sceptical as to the outcome of Mr. Roosevelt's well-meant appeal, until the sudden retirement of M. Delcassé, followed as it was by the accession of Premier Rouvier to the control of the French Foreign Office, brought to the surface a factor the weight of which was certain to be felt in the Tsar's inmost councils. In the most stolid and thick-headed of Grand Dukes, there is one keenly sensitive fibre, to wit, his money-nerve, and no one is so well qualified to touch it with electrifying effect as the practical head of the nation which, for a decade, has been Russia's almoner. When M. Rouvier let it be known that France was tired of playing the fool, and that, henceforth, her relations with the Tsar would be placed on a business footing, the Grand-Ducal practitioners of Muscovite bounce and buncombe were brought up with a round turn. If you want to dance any longer, M. Rouvier said in effect, it must be along the line of the Vistula, and not south of the Amur. We are tired of paying the piper for an ally who is fast sinking into impotence for an ally's service. If you wish for any more cash from France, bring what troops you have left under Linievitch back with all possible promptitude to the German frontier, and help us to restrain the German Kaiser, who is taking advantage of your willingness to exhaust your strength in Eastern Asia to upset our plans in Morocco to-day, and who may deal us a worse blow to-morrow. *There* is the force that really lies behind Mr. Roosevelt's suggestion, and there could be no greater mistake than to attribute the Tsar's unexpected tractability to the secret counsels of the German Emperor, who can have no possible interest in seeing Russia recover a fraction of her former influence in Continental Europe. To sum up the situation as it looks at the hour when we write, Russia, constrained by the knowledge that her paymaster means to tighten the purse-strings, may ultimately yield to the *vis major*, and accept such conditions of peace as Japan may see fit to dictate. Whether those terms are severe or relatively moderate will perhaps depend in large measure on the assurance that Japan may receive of England's disposition to

transform her present carefully restricted league with Japan into an intimate offensive and defensive alliance. Such an alliance the Mikado's Government would be justified in regarding as a guarantee of the security of its new-won possessions on the Asiatic mainland, and it could consequently afford to permit the House of Romanoff to "save its face." That Russia will be obliged to pay a pecuniary indemnity may, however, be taken for granted, though it may fall materially short of the billion dollars lately spoken of at Tokio in semiofficial quarters. Much depends, nevertheless, on Russia's avoidance of unnecessary delay at this critical conjuncture. If she waits until the army under Linievitch has been pulverized or rendered almost useless, her alliance will cease to be of any tangible value to France, her chance of extracting any more money from Paris will vanish, and it would become a matter of vital moment to French statesmen to arrive quickly at a permanent understanding with the German Emperor. On the other hand, it would pay France well to lend Russia half a billion dollars to insure the prompt conclusion of peace, and thus render possible the immediate transfer of Linievitch's army from Manchuria to Russian Poland.

The position that Mr. Roosevelt may deem it expedient to take with reference to the question of Morocco depends obviously to some extent on the solution of the problem presented in the Far East. It is true that our commercial interest in the Shereefian dominions is actually insignificant, but that a prospective expansion of it was contemplated by our State Department is a fair inference from the fact that the United States were represented in the international conference held at Madrid in July, 1880, with regard to Morocco's exterior relations. The signatories of the treaty then concluded comprehended, besides the United States, Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden and Norway. It is true that the primary object of the treaty was to protect the lives and property of foreigners in Morocco, but the compact contained a clause declaring that the Shereef conceded to every one of the Powers represented in the Madrid conference the right to the treatment of the "most favored nation." Now, there is no doubt that the recent treaty between France and Great Britain, to which Italy and Spain subsequently acceded, although it is understood to have assured to every Power represented in

the Madrid conference equality of commercial privilege for *thirty years*, did seem to contemplate the ultimate assertion by France of a protectorate over the Shereefian possessions similar to that now exercised by Great Britain in Egypt, if not formally equivalent to the French absorption of Tunis. There is no doubt, therefore, that Count, now Prince, von Bülow was technically justified in advising his imperial master that the new Anglo-French agreement was not permanently reconcilable with the compact entered into at Madrid in 1880. Whether Emperor William will deem it worth while to insist that the Anglo-French agreement, by which a tutelary function in Morocco is conceded to France, shall be reviewed at the international conference, to which Sultan Mulai Abdul Aziz has invited all the Powers ostensibly concerned, is, as we have said, a question unlikely to be settled until the outcome of the effort to bring about peace in Eastern Asia is definitely known. Meanwhile Great Britain has refused, while Germany has accepted, the Sultan's invitation. What answer Mr. Roosevelt will return has not been announced, and we find it hard to believe that it has yet been resolved upon. Our present Chief Magistrate is too thoroughly conversant with the European situation to imagine that the naval preponderance of France and England over Germany would necessarily render abortive any endeavor on the part of William II to set aside the Anglo-French arrangement with relation to Morocco. If Russia is to be condemned by Grand-Ducal folly to bleed to death on the coast of the Pacific, the immense superiority of Germany's army to any other land force collectible against her in Europe would enable her to solve the problem of Morocco inside of the French frontier.

We have said that the President has been requested by Norwegian citizens of the United States to recognize the independence declared by the Storthing, or Parliament, of Norway. When we recall how slow we were to acknowledge the right to self-government even of those Spanish-American commonwealths which had made good their rebellion against Spain, we must see that it might be deemed officious if, by a hasty acknowledgment of Norwegian independence, we should seem to anticipate the action of Powers far more deeply interested in the matter, such Powers, for example, as Russia, which would like an ice-free port on the Norwegian coast; as Germany, which would look upon a

united Scandinavia as a rampart against the westward trend of Muscovite ambition; and especially as Denmark, which has a prospect of giving a sovereign to independent Norway. There are other considerations which, naturally, would have a good deal of weight with Mr. Roosevelt. In view of the deplorable past, and with an eye to a conceivable, though, happily, improbable, future, the United States cannot afford to countenance the principle of secession. Neither would it be consistent for us to assume the rôle of encouraging or sanctioning political changes in Europe, seeing that we sternly forbid European Powers to foment or ratify political mutations in the Western Hemisphere. On the whole, we opine that Norway had better apply to Copenhagen, to Berlin, to London, or even to Stockholm before addressing itself to Washington for recognition. We may some day have troubles nearer home in Latin America, and it would scarcely be discreet or foresighted for Mr. Roosevelt to establish a precedent that might plague us.

No one who had the advantage of conversation with Mr. Wu Ting Fang, lately Chinese Minister at Washington, can be at a loss to understand the indignation expressed by Chinese merchants, students, travellers and literary men at the humiliation to which for years they have been subjected when seeking admission to this country. As long, however, as the complaints were confined for the most part to the Chinese literary class, the shoe did not pinch American business men. The case is otherwise, now that the commercial guilds of China have threatened to attest their resentment of our treatment of their fellow countrymen by boycotting American-made goods. Forthwith, American manufacturers and exporters experienced a change of heart, and on June 11 a delegation of the American Asiatic Association called at the White House to protest against the indiscriminate and exasperating enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Law. We are glad to chronicle that, in a letter to Secretary Metcalf, of the Department of Commerce and Labor, the President promptly ordered him to see to it that from this time forward the immigration officers at our various ports of entry exercise more discretion than they have been accustomed to do in the application of the exclusion law, to the end that our relations with the Chinese Empire may retain the cordiality to which on many grounds we are entitled.